commit 8b2b0898c02a168e0f4298dc1b439fcd776ce01c
parent 956c94f812e76c56b491d9246996f64e0aaa4e07
Author: Thorin-Oakenpants <Thorin-Oakenpants@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 14:04:13 +1200
typo
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/user.js b/user.js
@@ -1217,12 +1217,12 @@ user_pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.http2", false);
* This setting controls if the option "Display in Firefox" in the above setting is available
* and by effect controls whether PDFs are handled in-browser or externally ("Ask" or "Open With")
* [WHY USE false=default=view PDFs in Firefox]
- * pfdjs is lightweight, open source and as secure as any pdf reader out there, certainly better and more
+ * pdfjs is lightweight, open source and as secure as any pdf reader out there, certainly better and more
* vetted than most. Exploits are rare (1 serious case in 3 years), treated seriously and patched quickly.
* It doesn't break "state separation" of browser content (by not sharing with OS, independent apps). It
* maintains disk avoidance and application data isolation. It's convenient. You can still save to disk.
* [WHY USE true=open with or save to disk]
- * If you're a PDF security expert who thinks a particular external app is more secure...
+ * If you think a particular external app is more secure...
* [NOTE]
* 1. See 2662 2: JS can still force a pdf to open in-browser by bundling it's own code (rare) ***/
user_pref("pdfjs.disabled", false);